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UNTANGLING THE WORLD WIDE WEBLOG:
A PROPOSAL FOR BLOGGING,
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL, AND LIFESTYLE
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws are like spider’s webs: if some poor weak creature
come[s] up against them, it is caught; but a bigger one can
break through and get away.1
Imagine landing your dream job. All of your hard work and
education has finally paid off. You accept the job offer, give two weeks’
notice at your current place of employment, and move to another state to
start your dream job. Being far from home, and wanting to keep in touch
with family and friends scattered around the country, you start up a
blog. You plan to use your blog to allow your family and friends to read
a daily account of your life as you start your new job and begin setting
up your new apartment. Within two weeks of starting your dream job,
you are fired and unemployed. Unfortunately, this is the true story of
Mark Jen, the computer engineer who lost his dream job at Google
within two weeks of starting, because of his blog.2
Now consider the tragedy of losing a loved one in your life. You are
depressed, numb, and unable to express your feelings to a therapist.
You decide to start a blog as a form of therapy, because you think it may
be easier to write about your heartache than to talk about it. Your online
diary allows you to share your thoughts and feelings, and helps you
through the tough times. You return home one day to find an urgent
message from your employer on your answering machine requesting a
call back. During the discussion, you learn that your employer is firing
you because of pictures you posted on your blog. To your surprise, you
have lost your job after giving the company eight years of faithful service
with no prior employment discipline. For Ellen Simonetti, better known
as Queen of the Sky, this scenario is the true account of what happened
when Delta Airlines fired her because of her blog, Diary of a Flight
Attendant.3

THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 512 (5th ed. 1999) (quoting Solon).
See Mark Jen, The Official Story, Straight From the Source (Feb. 11, 2005, 9:35 a.m.),
http://blog.plaxoed.com/?p=27 (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (describing the events leading
up to his termination from Google).
3
See Ellen Simonetti, Perspective: I Was Fired For Blogging, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 16,
2004. Ellen Simonetti was fired because some of her pictures were in uniform; however,
Ms. Simonetti filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming
1
2
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After reading about the firings of employee bloggers Mark Jen and
Ellen Simonetti, you now know what it means to be dooced.4 Being
dooced refers to an employer’s termination of an employee because of
the employee’s blog postings.5 In recent years, many employees have
found out the hard way that their “clever little blog” can get them fired.6
Dooced employees have created a media frenzy, leaving
employment lawyers scrambling to advise corporate clients on how to
effectively and legally address employee blogging both proactively and
retroactively.7 Furthermore, blogging employees are wondering what
their rights are, if any, to engage in lawful off-duty blogging activities.8
that numerous male Delta employees had pictures posted on the internet in uniform for
which they were not punished. Id. Additionally, Ms. Simonetti filed a lawsuit in federal
court alleging, inter alia, discrimination based on sex “pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1991.” Complaint at *1, Simonetti v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-2321, 2005
WL 2897844 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2005), dismissed without prejudice, No. 1:05-CV-2321 (Oct. 28,
2005) (dismissing action pending order by the bankruptcy court lifting the stay due to
Delta’s bankruptcy filing).
4
See Heather Armstrong, About This Site, http://www.dooce.com/about.html (last
visited Aug. 7, 2007) (giving a chronological account of Heather Armstrong’s blogging
experience beginning in February 2001 through her firing in February 2002, to how she is
currently making use of her blog).
5
See Armstong, supra note 4 (describing the history of Ms. Armstrong’s blog). Ms.
Armstrong coined the word “dooced,” which derived from her workplace nickname,
“dooce.” Id. Armstong also named her blog Dooce. Id. Armstrong was fired for her blog
postings on dooce.com, which subsequently led to the term “dooced” being used to refer to
bloggers who have been fired for their online blog postings. Id.
6
Stephanie Armour, Warning: Your Clever Little Blog Could Get You Fired, USA TODAY,
June 15, 2005, at 1B (telling the stories of several employees who were fired for blogging).
7
Armour, supra note 6, at 1B; see, e.g., Kenneth Ebanks et al., Blogs Pose New Legal Issues
and Potential Liability for Corporate America, COVINGTON & BURLING, Apr. 14, 2005, http://
www.cov.com/files/Publication/95294ee2-4c37-4d24-9f6a-ccaca7f7debb/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/a5acd981-b292-4bac-9e23-d749027925f0/oid57967.pdf;
Kenneth
Ebanks et al., Employee Blogging, COVINGTON & BURLING, Apr. 18, 2005, http://www.cov.
com/files/Publication/8f1fe39d-4de9-46c4-9003-e75b7c277a1f/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/15431acd-319c-41ce-b22e-ea7f0f70b0e2/oid57969.pdf. Blogs pose company
liability concerns for:
defamation, copyright and trademark infringement, disclosure of trade
secrets or private consumer information, and other business torts.
Even comments posted to a blog by unrelated third parties might give
rise to claims of corporate liability. And any corporation that
distributes a blog everywhere the Internet reaches . . . should be
cognizant of the profound implications for legal liability relating to
personal jurisdiction and governing law.
Ebanks et al., Blogs Pose New Legal Issues and Potential Liability for Corporate America, supra.
8
Amour, supra note 6, at 1B. From the start, it is important to establish that this Note is
confined at addressing only blogging that takes place away from the workplace and offduty. The applicable legal consequences and policies are different for on-duty blogging
and are beyond the scope of this Note.
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To make matters worse, there are conflicts within employment law
jurisprudence applicable to the blogging phenomenon, particularly with
the policies of the employment-at-will doctrine and lifestyle
discrimination statutes that protect lawful off-duty activities.9 The
judicially created public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine do not necessarily provide protection for an employee’s offduty blogging activities.10 Existing lifestyle discrimination statutes leave
loopholes where not all aspects of blogging are protected; thus, at-will
employee bloggers seeking protection for their blogging activities must
turn to their state legislatures to either enact or amend existing lifestyle
discrimination statutes to protect lawful off-duty blogging activities and
the speech associated with the blog in furtherance of the public policies
behind lifestyle discrimination statutes.11 Statutory legislation is the
answer to give at-will employee bloggers certainty as to their right to
blog while away from work, because neither the currently enacted
lifestyle discrimination statutes nor the judicially enforced public policy
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine adequately protect lawful
off-duty activities, such as blogging and the speech that is associated
with those blogging activities.12 Certainty as to employees’ rights while
engaging in lawful off-duty activities, particularly while blogging, is
needed to protect employees from surprise firings from places of
employment that do not already have clearly communicated blogging
policies.13
First, this Note discusses the history of blogging and its place in
employment law.14 Second, this Note analyzes the adequacy of current
employment law jurisprudence in addressing blogging and the
employment relationship and discusses the need to protect at-will

9
See infra Parts II.B-C (discussing blogging in the context of judicial and legislative
employment law).
10
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine and their potential applicability to bloggers).
11
See infra text accompanying notes 166-171 (illustrating several policy grounds for
providing comprehensive legislative protection for at-will employee bloggers through
lifestyle discrimination statutes).
12
See infra Parts III.A-B (analyzing the need for legislative action to protect blogging and
the online speech associated with blogging).
13
See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text (identifying blog-related firings). For
examples of employers with clearly communicated blogging policies, see infra note 58. See
also infra notes 166-71 (providing policy reasons for lifestyle discrimination statutes’
protection of bloggers).
14
See infra Part II. This Part discusses the general history of blogging. Id. This Part also
explains and examines judicial and legislative employment law. Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 8

248

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

employee blogger’s speech.15 Third, this Note proposes a model
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute to protect at-will
employee bloggers in an effort to further the public policies behind
lifestyle discrimination statutes.16
II. BACKGROUND
With each new headline reporting another story of a dooced
employee, mounting tension continues to fester between employers and
employees, each seeking answers about legal rights.17 Likewise, courts
are searching for answers to the novel legal questions blogs present to
employment law jurisprudence.18 Despite the legal issues blogs raise,
the popularity of blogging has not decreased.19 The roots of the legal
issues surrounding the blogging culture begin with the history of the
laws in conflict.20
First, this Part explains the general history of blogging, sets out the
generally applicable legal principles related to blogging, and explains
how blogging has made its way into employment relationships.21
Second, this Part discusses blogging in the context of judicially created
employment law, particularly, the employment-at-will doctrine.22
Finally, this Part discusses blogging in the context of legislatively created
employment laws, specifically lifestyle discrimination statutes.23

15
See infra Part III. This Part explains why at-will employee bloggers’ speech should be
protected, and why the legislature is the best place for protection. Id. Additionally, this
Part analyzes the various shortcomings of the employment-at-will public policy exceptions
and the loopholes in the current lifestyle discrimination statutes as applied to bloggers. Id.
16
See infra Part IV. The author proposes a model comprehensive lifestyle discrimination
statute that would protect at-will employee bloggers’ lawful off-duty blogging activities
and the speech that necessarily accompanies blogging. Id.
17
See Paul S. Gutman, Note, Say What?: Blogging and Employment Law in Conflict, 27
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 145, 147 (2003).
18
Henry Hoang Pham, Bloggers and the Workplace: The Search for a Legal Solution to the
Conflict Between Employee Blogging and Employers, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 207, 210 (2006).
19
See Elizabeth R. Rita & Eric D. Gunning, Navigating the Blogosphere in the Workplace,
COLO. LAW., May 2006, at 55 (attributing the growth of blogging partly to the creation of
user-friendly software that makes the setup and maintenance of blogs simple for even
below-average computer users); Gutman, supra note 17, at 146-47 (identifying several userfriendly, web-based blog software options). The software enables users to set up a blog in
less than five minutes. Gutman, supra note 17, at 146-47. “Because these applications are
available from any computer with World Wide Web access, one does not have to own a
computer to speak online. Only access is needed.” Id.
20
See infra Part II.A.1 (detailing the history of blogging).
21
See infra Part II.A (discussing the blogging and its emergence within the law).
22
See infra Part II.B (examining blogging and the employment-at-will doctrine).
23
See infra Part II.C (explaining the current types of lifestyle discrimination statutes).
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A. The Emergence of Blogs: From the World Wide Web to a Web of Legal
Issues
Blogging is a relatively new phenomenon that has found popularity
among a wide variety of age groups and professions.24 Recently,
blogging has also emerged in employment law, where it is creating a
host of new legal controversies.25 This Section offers a history of
blogging and its emergence in the law.26 This Section also gives a brief
overview of general legal principles applicable to blogging.27 Finally,
this Section explains how blogging has appeared in the employment
relationship.28
1.

History of Blogging

Historically, internet users created weblogs as a way to help other
internet users bypass traditional search engines, cut down on search
time, and provide commentary about useful websites in one convenient
place.29 The function of a weblog, now commonly referred to as a blog,
has changed significantly in recent years into a pop culture phenomenon
used for computer-mediated communications that enable online
socializing.30 Blogs now host a wide assortment of information ranging
24
See supra note 19 (discussing the how the growth of blogging has been propounded by
recent technological developments).
25
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing a general overview of blogging and its place in the
law).
26
See infra Part II.A.1.
27
See infra Part II.A.2.
28
See infra Part II.A.3.
29
Gutman, supra note 17, at 145. Gutman explains that the need for expediting the
search process stemmed from the days when high-speed internet access was rare and most
dial-up internet connections charged an hourly fee. Id. See generally Rebecca Blood,
Weblogs: A History and Perspective, REBECCA’S POCKET, Sept. 7, 2000, http://www.rebecca
blood.net/essays/weblog_history.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (discussing the origin of
the term “weblog” and its beginning use as a filtering system in which the web has been
“pre-surfed” in order to direct users to particularly useful websites); Wikipedia, Blog,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (reporting the chronological
history of blogging beginning in 1994 through the present).
30
SUSAN C. HERRING ET AL., CONVERSATIONS IN THE BLOGOSPHERE: AN ANALYSIS “FROM
THE BOTTOM UP” 1 (2005), available at http://www.blogninja.com/hicss05.blogconv.pdf.
Other common computer-mediated communications that promote online socializing
include email and instant messaging. Id. at 1 n.1. See also AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH
FOX, BLOGGERS: A PORTRAIT OF THE INTERNET’S NEW STORYTELLERS 6 (2006), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP%20Bloggers%20Report%20July%2019%202006.pd
f. Bloggers regularly use technology as a way of socializing. LENHART & FOX, supra.
Research identifies bloggers as:
among the most enthusiastic communicators of the modern age, taking
advantage of nearly every opportunity to communicate. Seventy-eight
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from daily life experiences, politics, and government, to sports and
entertainment, making an exact definition debatable and incomplete.31
Moreover, blog popularity and growth has lead to the development of
commonplace online blog language and definitions.32 With thousands of

percent of bloggers say they send or receive instant messages. By
comparison, 38% of all internet users send and receive instant
messages. Again, bloggers outstrip their high-speed counterparts (40%
of home broadband users IM) and even internet users between 18 and
29 years old (54% of whom IM). Fifty-five percent of bloggers say they
send or receive text messages using a cell phone, compared with 40%
of home broadband users and 60% of younger internet users.
Id. Contra Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Workplace Blogs and Workers’ Privacy, 66 LA. L.
REV. 1079, 1081 (2006) (asserting that September 11, 2001, and the Iraq war have changed
blogs from “blurts about the writer’s day” into a new form of communication). “[D]uring
the crisis, the market for serious news commentary soared. . . . [P]eople were not just
hungry for news, . . . [people] were hungry for communication, for checking their gut
against someone they had come to know, for emotional support and psychological
bonding.” Id. at 1081-82.
31
David L. Hudson, Jr., Blogs and the First Amendment, 11 NEXUS 129, 129 (2006);
LENHART & FOX, supra note 30, at 1.
The Pew Internet Project blogger survey finds that the American
blogosphere is dominated by those who use their blogs as personal
journals. Most bloggers do not think of what they do as journalism.
Most bloggers say they cover a lot of different topics, but when
asked to choose one main topic, 37% of bloggers cite “my life and
experiences” as a primary topic of their blog. Politics and government
ran a very distant second with 11% of bloggers citing those issues of
public life as the main subject of their blog.
Entertainment-related topics were the next most popular blogtype, with 7% of bloggers, followed by sports (6%), general news and
current events (5%), business (5%), technology (4%), religion,
spirituality or faith (2%), a specific hobby or a health problem or illness
(each comprising 1% of bloggers). Other topics mentioned include
opinions, volunteering, education, photography, causes and passions,
and organizations.
LENHART & FOX, supra note 30, at ii; cf. Merriam-Webster Online, Blog,
http://www.webster.com/dictionary/blog (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (defining a blog as “a
Web site that contains an online personal journal with reflections, comments, and often
hyperlinks provided by the writer”). But see HERRING ET AL., supra note 30, at 1 (pointing
out that some authors are of the opinion that a blog must be linked to other blogs in order
to be defined as a blog).
32
See Merriam-Webster Online, Merriam-Webster Announces 2004 Words,
http://www.m-w.com/info/pr/2004-words-of-year.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2007)
(announcing “blog” as the 2004 word of the year based on online lookups). Some blogging
websites provide links to dictionary-like compilations that define blogging terms to keep
bloggers informed of current blogging vocabulary. See, e.g., Pointblog.com, What’s A Blog?,
in HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS AND CYBER-DISSIDENTS 7-8 (2005), http://www.rsf.org/IMG/
pdf/Bloggers_Handbook2.pdf. Examples of commonly used blogging terms include:
BLOG

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/8

Byers: Untangling the World Wide Weblog: A Proposal for Blogging, Employ

2007]

Untangling the World Wide Weblog

251

blogs created daily, and millions of others maintained, questions about
what legal issues blogs present inevitably have followed as blogging
makes its way from the World Wide Web to the courthouse.33 Such
courthouse folly raises many legal issues, including First Amendment
speech protections.34
2.

General Overview of Blogging and the Law

The United States Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
is definite in its protection of anonymous speech as well as its extension
to anonymous internet speech.35 First Amendment speech protection is
Short for Weblog. A website that contains written material, links or
photos being posted all the time, usually by one individual, on a
personal basis.
(TO) BLOG
Run a blog or post material on one.
BLOGGER
Person who runs a blog.
BLOGOSPHERE
All blogs, or the blogging community.
BLOGROLL
List of external links appearing on a blog, often links to other blogs and
usually in a column on the homepage. Often amounts to a “subcommunity” of bloggers who are friends.
BLOGWARE
Software used to run a blog.
Id.
See William H. Floyd III & James T. Hedgepath, The Electronic Workplace, S.C. LAW.,
May 2006, at 38; Jennifer L. Peterson, The Shifting Legal Landscape of Blogging, WIS. LAW.,
Mar. 2006, at 8; Rita &. Gunning, supra note 19, at 55.
34
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing blogging and some applicable general legal principles).
The First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause proscribes the government from
interfering with this right, declaring that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech. . . “ U.S. CONST. amend. I. Employees find it surprising that the First
Amendment only limits government action, and fails to protect employees working in the
private sector or to restrict private employers’ behavior. For a discussion of First
Amendment rights and the non-applicability to private sector employees, see Patrick D.
Robben, Protecting the Anonymity of Bloggers and Blog Sources: Evolving Case Law Applies Old
Principles to New Technology, 10 J. INTERNET LAW NO. 4, 1 (2006).
35
McIntyre v. Oh. Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (referring to the interest in
advancing of the marketplace of ideas as outweighing the public’s interest of identity
disclosure). In McIntyre, the Supreme Court invalidated a portion of the Ohio Code, which
prohibited the distribution of campaign literature without the name and address of the
individual distributing the literature. Id. at 357. “Accordingly, an author’s decision to
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of
a publication, is an aspect of freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at
342. The Court identified one of the purposes of anonymous speech as avoiding fear of
official or economic retaliation and bias. Id. The Court analogized this purpose with the
practice of grading law school exams “blindly” in that the law professor does not know the
identity of the writer while grading the paper. Id. at n.5.
33

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 8

252

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

not triggered, however, for certain low value speech categories such as
obscenity,36 fighting words,37 and defamation.38
While the First
Amendment protects freedom of speech, anonymous speech, and
internet speech, there has yet to be a decision as to whether bloggers’
online speech is protected within any of the aforementioned categories.39

Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy
and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the
majority. . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights,
and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular
individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the
hand of an intolerant society. The right to remain anonymous may be
abused when it shields fraudulent conduct.
Id. at 357; Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999) (invalidating a
Colorado law that required initiative-petition circulators to wear an identification badge
stating their names). The Supreme Court in Buckley relied on McIntyre in invalidating the
law on First Amendment grounds. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 199. See also, Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 870 (1997). The Supreme Court recognized the Internet as “a unique medium—
known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no particular geographical location but
available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.” Id. at 851.
“Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.” Id. at 870; Doe v.
2TheMart.Com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (noting that “Internet
anonymity facilitates the rich, diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas”); Doe v. Cahill,
884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (“Anonymous internet speech in blogs or chat rooms in some
instances can become the modern equivalent of political pamphleteering.”).
36
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). In Miller, the Court enumerated an obscenity test that is still used today. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 985 (2d ed. 2002).
The Court said that ‘‘the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community
standards’ would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.’’
Id.
37
Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Court defined fighting words
as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace.” Id. at 572. The Chaplinski Court held that fighting words include calling
someone a “damn Fascist.” Id. at 574. “The Supreme Court never has overturned
Chaplinski; fighting words remain a category of speech unprotected by the First
Amendment. But in more than half a century since Chaplinski, the Court has never again
upheld a fighting words conviction.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 968.
38
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (holding public officials must
show by clear and convincing evidence the falsity of the defamatory statement, and actual
malice to recover in a defamation case).
39
Julie China, Blogger’s Anonymous, FED. LAW., Mar. 2006, at 6.
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When the anonymity protections of the First Amendment are
invoked in a tort action, the issues must be resolved by balancing the
benefits of secrecy versus the need for disclosure.40 For bloggers, the
anonymity protections of the First Amendment are most likely to be
invoked by those that blog using a screen name or other pseudonym.41
A clash exists between the anonymous speech that the First Amendment
protects and the necessity of disclosure in defamation suits.42
The tort of defamation requires, at minimum, a false and defamatory
statement concerning another, an unprivileged publication to a third
party, fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher,
and either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or
the existence of special harm caused by the publication.43 Recently,
courts have seen a rise in the number of defamation suits filed by
plaintiffs who claim defamation perpetrated by an anonymous online
speaker.44
The law is currently unsettled as to when and under what
circumstances courts will compel disclosure of a blogger’s identity in a
defamation proceeding.45 Courts must exercise discretion and caution
when identifying anonymous speakers because of the growing threat to
First Amendment freedom of anonymous speech.46 Essentially, courts
must determine the scope of a blogger’s First Amendment right to
anonymous online speech, and what a plaintiff must show to discover an

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 941.
Peterson, supra note 33, at 8, 11.
42
China, supra note 39, at 6.
43
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). Generally, “[a] communication is
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him.” Id. § 559. While the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides an initial analysis of
defamation law, the boundaries of defamation “have been constrained by a speaker’s free
speech rights under the First Amendment.” Jennifer O’Brien, Note, Putting a Face to a
(Screen) Name: The First Amendment Implications of Compelling ISPS to Reveal the Identities of
Anonymous Internet Speakers in Online Defamations Cases, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2751
(2002).
44
O’Brien, supra note 43, at 2746.
45
See Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., Inc., No. 0425 Mar.
Term 2004, 2006 WL 37020, at *4 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 4, 2006) (“Faced with the problems and
benefits of Internet, courts have arrived at differing standards for determining whether to
allow disclosure of an anonymous internet user’s identity when the user is sued for making
defamatory statements over the Internet.”).
46
Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive HandWringing Over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 801 (2004). Mr. Vogel warns that
although “well intentioned, the rush to apply new standards should be slowed.” Id.
40
41
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anonymous blogger’s identity.47 In balancing the competing interests,
the anonymous blogger has a First Amendment right to speak
anonymously and the plaintiff has the right to protect proprietary
interests and reputation through the pursuit of the available causes of
action based on the conduct of the anonymous blogger.48 Leaving
47
Doe v. 2TheMart.Com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2001). In
2TheMart.Com Inc., the court articulated a balancing test for determining when, through a
civil subpoena, the identity of an anonymous Internet user who is not a party to the
underlying litigation would be disclosed. Id. at 1095. The test is:
whether: (1) the subpoena seeking the information was issued in good
faith and not for any improper purpose, (2) the information sought
relates to a core claim or defense, (3) the identifying information is
directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense, and (4)
information sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim or defense
is unavailable from any other source.
Id.
48
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No.3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. 2001). The New Jersey
Supreme Court set forth its state’s standard for when granting an order compelling an
Internet Service Provider to disclose the identity of an anonymous Internet poster who is
sued for allegedly violating the rights of an individual, corporation or business. Id. The
New Jersey Supreme Court outlined a balancing test in which
the trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to
notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena
or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to afford
the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and
serve opposition to the application. These notification efforts should
include posting a message of notification of the identity discovery
request to the anonymous user on the ISP’s pertinent message board.
The court shall also require the plaintiff to identify and set for the
exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that
plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech.
The complaint and all information provided to the court should
be carefully reviewed to determine whether plaintiff has set forth a
prima facie cause of action against the fictitiously–named anonymous
defendants. In addition to establishing that its action can withstand a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted . . . the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence supporting
each element of its cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a
court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed
defendant.
Finally, assuming the court concludes that the plaintiff has
presented a prima facie cause of action, the court must balance the
defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against
the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the
disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to allow the plaintiff
to properly proceed.
Id. at 760-61. See also Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (adopting a standard to
apply when a public figure plaintiff seeks to identify an anonymous defendant). The
Delaware Supreme Court adopted a standard “that appropriately balances one person’s
right to speak anonymously against another person’s right to protect his reputation.” Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that a plaintiff bringing a defamation suit against an
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behind defamation, an alternative tort theory that is available is invasion
of privacy.49
Invasion of privacy is a cause of action in which bloggers could find
themselves as either a plaintiff or defendant.50 Invasion of privacy
consists of four different theories: intrusion upon seclusion, publicizing
private facts, false light, and appropriation of name or likeness.51 There
is a trend in employment law to bring wrongful termination suits under
a common law invasion of privacy theory as employees have become
increasingly sensitive about keeping their employers out of their private
lives.52 While common law invasion of privacy can signal a cause of
action on its own, in the employment relationship, it can also be used in
conjunction with a wrongful termination suit as an argument for an
extension of a public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine.53 Blogging employees, especially those working under an
employment-at-will presumption, are finding out that tortuous wrongful
termination suits are often misplaced under the current employment law
jurisprudence.54
3.

Blogging and the Employment Relationship

Constitutional and tort law conflicts are just some of the many legal
issues that blogs present in employment law, affecting both employers
and employees alike.55
Nevertheless, the popularity of blogging
continues to grow.56 Employees maintain blogs about many different
anonymous blogger must meet a summary judgment standard before the courts would
order disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity. Id. at 457.
49
See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing the invasion of privacy claims
that a blogger may have brought against him or that he may bring).
50
See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Bloggers’ FAQ—Privacy, http://www.eff.org/
bloggers/lg/faq-privacy.php (last visited Aug, 9, 2007) (answering questions about
invasion of privacy liability).
51
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
52
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 480 (3rd ed. 2004).
53
See infra Part II.B (discussing the public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine).
54
See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing a general overview of blogging and the employment
relationship).
55
See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (identifying the several legal issues
applicable to blogging).
56
See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing the growth of blogging).
Employers are increasingly becoming aware of the potential issues employees’ blogs raise
because of bloggers’ ability to “post content that disparages the company, defames the
company’s image, calls into question the company’s financial performance, harasses other
employees, or leaks the company’s proprietary information.” Rita & Gunning, supra note
19, at 56.
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subjects, some of which are specifically geared toward other employees
in the same industry or profession.57 Some employers have corporate
blogs with corresponding corporate blogging policies, which encourage
employee blogging if done in compliance with the aforementioned
corporate blogging policies.58 A number of employee blogs that describe
57
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1086. Employee blogs that are geared specifically
toward a particular industry often solicit feedback from fellow employees or are
informational to keep co-workers up to date on “issues of collective concern.” Id. Other
employee bloggers seek to discuss the various aspects of their jobs with others in the same
industry. Id. “Bloggers of this type can be found in a variety of professions such as law,
accounting, and medicine, as well as in other industries such as the construction industry.”
Id.
58
See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Sun News—Sun Blogs, http://www.sun.com/aboutsun/
media/blogs/policy.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2007) (outlining advice for employee blogs
and encouraging employees to blog about their work, provided that the employee follows
“the advise in this note”); Sun Microsystems, Sun’s Blogging Guidelines, http://www.sun.
com/aboutsun/media/blogs/BloggingGuidelines.pdf (last visited Aug. 9 2007)
(summarizing the companies general guidelines for employee blogs). Sun Microsystems’
advice centers on being careful and responsible; however, the company clearly states,
“violation of any applicable company policy may result in disciplinary action up to and
including termination of employment.” Sun Microsystems, Sun’s Blogging Guidelines,
supra.
Posting the wrong thing on your blog could:
•
Lose Sun its right to export technology outside the U.S.
•
Get Sun and you in legal trouble with U.S. and other government
agencies.
•
Lose Sun its trademark on key terms like Java and Solaris.
•
Cost us the ability to get patents.
•
Cost you your job at Sun.
Id. The most important rules for Sun employees to follow when blogging include:
1.
Do not disclose or speculate on non-public financial or operation
information. The legal consequences could be swift and severe for you
and Sun.
2.
Do not disclose non-public technical information (for example,
code) without approval. Sun could instantly lose its right to export its
products and technologies to most of the world or to protect its
intellectual property.
3.
Do not disclose personal information about other individuals.
4.
Do not disclose confidential information, Sun’s or anyone else’s.
5.
Do not discuss work-related legal proceedings or controversies,
including communications with Sun attorneys.
6.
Always refer to Sun’s trademarked names properly. For example,
never use a trademark as a noun, since this could result in a loss of our
trademark rights.
7.
Do not post others’ material, for example photographs, articles, or
music, without ensuring they’ve granted appropriate permission to do
this.
Follow Sun’s Standards of Business Conduct and uphold Sun’s
reputation for integrity. In particular, ensure that your comments
about companies and products are truthful, accurate, and fair and can
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be substantiated, and avoid disparaging comments about individuals.
Id. Yahoo advises its employees of the legal ramifications of their
blogs, and has instituted best practices guidelines for employees to
follow if they blog.
Yahoo! Personal Blog Guidelines: 1.0,
http://jermey.zawodny.com/yahoo/yahoo-blog-guidelines.pdf (last
visited Aug. 9, 2007). Yahoo’s best practices guidelines are not rules,
and therefore cannot be broken, but should voluntarily be followed.
Id. at 2. There are four best practices guidelines, including:
Be Respectful of Your Colleagues
1.
Be thoughtful and accurate in your posts, and be respectful of
how other Yahoos may be affected. All Yahoo! employees can be
viewed (correctly or incorrectly) as representative of the company,
which can add significance to your public reflections on the
organization (whether you intend to or not). Yahoos who identify
themselves as Yahoo! employees in their blogs and comment on the
company at any time, should notify their manager of the existence of
their blog just to avoid any surprises. To be clear, you are not being
asked to alert your manager of your posts, just to consider letting them
know you have a blog where you may write about Yahoo!. Whether
your manager chooses to occasionally read your blog or not, the
courtesy head’s up is always appreciated.
Get Your Facts Straight
2.
As a Yahoo! employee with intranet access, you have the
opportunity to contact the Yahoos who are responsible for the
products, services, or other initiatives that you may want to write
about. To ensure you are not misrepresenting your fellow Yahoos or
their work, consider reaching out to a member of the relevant team
before posting. This courtesy will help you provide your readers with
accurate insights, especially when you are blogging outside your area
of expertise. If there is someone at Yahoo! who knows more about the
topic than you, check with them to make sure you have your facts
straight.
Provide Context to Your Argument
3.
Please be sure to provide enough support in your posting to help
Yahoos understand your reasoning, be it positive or negative. We
appreciate the value of multiple perspectives, so help us to understand
yours by providing context to your opinion. Whether you are posting
in praise or criticism of Yahoo!, you are encouraged to develop a
thoughtful argument that extends well beyond “(insert) is cool” or
“(insert) sucks.”
Engage in Private Feedback:
4.
Not everyone who is reading your blog will feel comfortable
approaching you if they are concerned their feedback will become
public. In order to maintain an open dialogue that everyone can
comfortably engage in, Yahoo! bloggers are asked to welcome “offblog” feedback from their colleagues who would like to privately
respond, make suggestions, or report errors without having their
comments appear your blog. Bloggers want to know what you think. If
you have an opinion, correction or criticism regarding a posting, reach
out for the blogger directly. Whether privately or on their blog, let the
blogger know your thoughts.
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aspects of an employee’s personal life and work life, have received
extensive media attention after the blog caught the attention of the
blogger’s employer, and ended in termination.59 Unfortunately, it is
usually only after an employee is fired that the employee learns of the
employment relationship’s legal considerations.60 Furthermore, while
employers and employees alike have legal rights, remedies, and
responsibilities within the employment relationship, the employment-atwill doctrine usually trumps many of the employee’s rights.61
B. Blogs and the Application of Judicial Employment Law: Employment-atWill
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where
they please, and to discharge or retain employe[e]s at will for
good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without
thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right
which an employe[e] may exercise in the same way, to the
same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the
employer.62

Id. at 2-3. See also Floyd III & Hedgepath, supra note 33, at 38 (discussing the popularity of
corporate and workplace blogs in major corporations, including IBM); Peterson, supra note
33, at 10 (discussing the rational behind corporate blogging including marketing new ideas
and products); Ebanks et al., supra note 7.
Commentators are already calling 2005 “The Year of the Corporate
Blog,” as a number of the nation’s leading companies – including GM,
Boeing, Microsoft and Sun Microsystems – have leapt into the fray,
publishing official corporate blogs or quasi-official blogs authored by
corporate insiders.
These corporate blogs can permit global
communication at minimal cost, raise a company’s profile, help roll out
a new product or redefine a brand’s image.
Ebanks et al., supra note 7.
59
Hudson, supra note 31, at 133-34; see supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (detailing
the stories of dooced employees).
60
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103; see also Peterson, supra note 33, at 8,10
(warning that “bloggers should be – but almost universally are not—familiar with basic
legal issues inescapable in a medium in which every thought can be read by an Internet
audience of untold millions”); Armour, supra note 6, at B1 (reporting on several employees’
stories of termination because of the content of their blogs, many of which claimed to have
had no warning). See generally Electronic Frontier Foundation, Bloggers’ FAQ: Labor Law,
http://www.eff.org/bloggers/lg/faq-labor.php (last visited Sept. 7, 2007) (discussing legal
issues arising from employees’ blogs).
61
See infra Part II.B (examining blogging and the employment-at-will doctrine).
62
Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), rev’d on other grounds, Hutton v.
Waters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
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Employment law in the United States is founded on the
employment-at-will doctrine.63 The employment-at-will doctrine is a
departure from the English common law regarding the agricultural
master and servant relationships.64 Originally, the employment-at-will
doctrine was a legal presumption that governed employer and employee
relations, and provided that the employment relationship was
terminable by either party without penalty.65 Today, the employment-atwill doctrine is largely a legal rule, “not subject to rebuttal except in
extraordinary circumstances.”66
Nearly every state follows the
ALFRED G. FELIU, PRIMER ON INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 1996). In the
1880’s the employment-at-will doctrine began to permeate American law. Id.
[I]n 1877, Horace Gay Wood, a respected attorney from Albany, New
York, published a treatise entitled [sic] Master and Servant, which
authoritatively announced that in the United States ‘‘the rule is
inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at
will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden
is upon him to establish it by proof.’’ Although Wood’s analysis has
subsequently been fully discredited, the rule he announced was
uniformly followed by the U.S. courts.
Id. at 3. Over the years, the employment-at-will doctrine grew and developed into a body
of law that governed employer and employee relations. Id. at 1. Since the 1970’s the
employment-at-will doctrine has remained unfettered, consistent, and largely unchanged.
Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958). The American Law
Institute defines employment-at-will or period of employment as the following:
Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to
employ and to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which
are terminable upon notice by either party; if neither party terminates
the employment, it may terminate by lapse of time or by supervening
events.
Id.
64
ANDREW D. HILL, “WRONGFUL DICHARGE” AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE 1 (1987); see also FELIU, supra note 63, at 1. In England when a
servant was hired, the presumption was for a one-year term. Feliu, supra note 63, at 2. The
one year term presumption worked well in an agricultural society because “masters were
assured of labor during the planting and harvesting seasons, while servants were secure in
the knowledge that they would be cared for during the harsh winter months.” Id. The
need for the employment-at-will doctrine grew out of the industrialization in America and
“provided American industry with a steady and flexible workforce that helped propel the
economic growth of a rapidly industrializing nation.” Id. at 3.
65
FELIU, supra note 63, at 1. As a legal presumption, the employment-at-will doctrine
could be rebutted by the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Id. See also Pauline
T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671,
677 (1996) (“Just as the employee is free to quite her job for any reason at all, the employer
may discharge an employee ‘for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong,
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.’”).
66
FELIU, supra note 63, at 1. The shift from a legal presumption to a legal rule changed
the dynamics of challenging wrongful discharge claims. Id.; see also Kim, supra note 65, at
677. Ms. Kim points out that although the employment-at-will doctrine is a presumption of
which the parties are always free to contract to the contrary, today, the presumption has
the weight of a legal rule. Id. at 677.
63
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employment-at-will doctrine.67 Courts have created exceptions in
specific circumstances to deviate from the general rules of the
employment-at-will doctrine.68 These exceptions generally fall into two
categories, those based in contract and those based in public policy, each
of which are discussed in turn in this Section.69
1.

Exceptions Based in Contract

The good faith and fair dealing exception is the least recognized
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine because of a grounded
adherence to the right of freedom of contract.70 The good faith and fair
dealing exception is an outgrowth of implied contract law.71
Jurisdictions that recognize the good faith and fair dealing exception
have generally done so by interpreting employee handbooks as an
implied contractual obligation.72
Employers may overcome the
67
Montana and the District of Columbia do not adhere to the employment-at-will
doctrine. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2005) (“A discharge is wrongful only if . . . the
discharge was not for good cause . . .”).
68
Kim, supra note 65, at 678 (noting that the exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine may seem numerous, but “they are generally narrow in scope and quite
specifically defined”).
69
See infra Parts II.B.1-2 (explaining both contractual and public policy exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine).
70
Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-AtWill Doctrine: Its’s Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1583, 1591 (1994).
71
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). “Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”
Id.
a. Express and implied contracts. Contracts are often spoken of as
express or implied. The distinction involves, however, no difference in
legal effect, but lies merely in the mode of manifesting assent. Just as
assent may be manifested by words or other conduct, sometimes
including silence, so intention to make a promise may be manifested in
language or by implication from other circumstances, including course
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.
...
b. Quasi-contracts. Implied contracts are different from quasi-contracts,
although in some cases the line between the two is indistinct. . . .
Quasi-contracts have often been called implied contracts or contracts
implied in law; but, unlike true contracts, quasi-contracts are not based
on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the performances
in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations created by law
for reasons of justice.
Id. at § 4.
72
See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 749-50. The “handbook exception” to the
employment-at-will rule was generally not recognized before the 1980’s. Id. A majority of
state courts have decided that under the right circumstances employee handbooks can
create an implied contract. Id. at 750.
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argument that an employee handbook creates an implied contract by
using a disclaimer in the handbook that specifically negates any
possibility that the handbook creates promises.73 Employee handbooks,
however, are not the only means by which courts identify implied
contractual obligations.74
Courts have also found oral assurances to be the basis of an implied
contract for which the good faith and fair dealing exception applies.75
The use of an implied contractual exception is extremely limited, and
courts generally only allow its use in cases where an employee is
unjustly discharged after many years of service, or if the discharge is an
attempt to avoid paying an employee’s wages or other benefits.76 The
limited applicability of this exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
lessens the likelihood that bloggers could successfully bring a wrongful
discharge claim using it.77 Supplementary to the implied contract
safeguards, the flexibility of the public policy exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine afford protection in many areas that
contract based exceptions do not.78

Kim, supra note 64, at 680; see, e.g., Robinson v. Christopher Greater Area Rural Health
Planning Corp., 566 N.E.2d 768, 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Federal Express Corp. v.
Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993).
Generally, courts require a disclaimer to be clear and unequivocal,
conspicuously placed, and communicated to or acknowledged by the
employee.
Employers that require employees to sign an
acknowledgement of the disclaimer usually have success defending
against claims based on their handbooks, assuming the disclaimer
language is clear and they do not make representations inconsistence
with at-will status. Some of the most effective disclaimers have been
contained in the employment application form, which applicants must
sign, and not in an employee handbook. Similarly, courts generally
accept disclaimers printed in large type of placed at the beginning of
the handbook.
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 753.
74
See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing oral assurances as a basis of
implied employment contract formation).
75
Kim, supra note 65, at 678.
76
Pennington, supra note 70, at 1593.
77
Gutman, supra note 17, at 160. “One major caveat is inherent to this particular
exception: any blogger claiming a violation of an implied contract must be certain to have
clean hands.” Id. Mr. Gutman, in analyzing this exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine, predicts that “[i]t is fairly clear that as a blogger, an employee cannot successfully
claim this exception.” Id.
78
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the various judicially created public policy exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine).
73
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Public Policy Exceptions

A variety of public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine exist.79 Generally, courts have granted public policy exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine for employees discharged for
refusing to participate in fraudulent practices such as, fraudulent
submission of false documentation or claims, or participation in other
unlawful criminal acts.80 One of the first decisions establishing the
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine dealt with
the wrongful termination of an employee who was fired for refusing to
give false testimony at a legislative hearing.81
Contrary to an employee engaging in criminal conduct, courts
initially grappled to come to a consensus for a public policy exception
when an employee was discharged for performing a statutory or
constitutional duty.82 Initially, some courts refrained from legislating
from the bench in creating such an exception, absent statutory authority
or legislative history that would support such an exception.83 Employees
Pennington, supra note 70, at 1596. Employees have also sued for wrongful discharge
for refusing to engage in fraudulent bookkeeping or recordkeeping. Id.
80
See Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are There Legal Protections for Employees Who
Blog?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 355, 375 (2007) (noting that only five states have not
permitted a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for employees who
refuse to violate the law on behalf of their employers).
81
Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 26 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). In
Petermann, the plaintiff was fired after he refused to commit perjury on behalf of his
employer. Id. The court held:
to hold that one’s continued employment could be made contingent
upon his commission of a felonious act at the instance of his employer
would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the part of both
employee and employer and would serve to contaminate the honest
administration of public affairs. This is patently contrary to the public
welfare.
Id. at 27.
82
Pennington, surpa note 70, at 1602. Mr. Pennington points out that when courts were
first faced with the issue of an employee being discharged for serving on a jury there were
no statutes explicitly prohibiting such dismissals. Id.
The response taken by different courts, faced with the same issue,
illustrates how judicial exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
have created unequal rights for employees and confusion in the law.
While some courts are willing to find employer liability when state
statutes are silent regarding activity allegedly causing dismissal, other
courts decline to utilize the public policy exception and dismiss
wrongful discharge actions not identifying a clear legislative
pronouncement of the public interest.
Id.
83
Id. at 1603. In Mallard v. Boring, the California Court of Appeals refused to
acknowledge a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for an employee
79
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who are fired for performing the civic service of jury duty best illustrate
a situation in which the public policy exception for performing a
statutory duty is applied.84 Courts now universally recognize a public
policy exception for employees who have been terminated or sanctioned
for taking time off work for jury duty, whether through a judicially
created right or legislation that mandates such a result.85
Turning to the issue of employer misconduct, as opposed to
employee conduct, employees who report or expose their employer’s
illegal conduct are known as whistleblowers.86 Courts and legislatures
alike recognize a public interest in exposing illegal or unethical business
practices.87 A public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
for whistleblowing attempts to strike a balance between the public’s
interest in having employers follow the statutory law and the employer’s

that had been discharged for taking time off work to serve on a jury. 6 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173
(Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
Although we may feel that this would be good public policy, to so
hold would establish a rule which would apply in all instances where
persons are discharged from their employment because they have
made themselves available for jury service, regardless of the
circumstances. If public policy requires that this protection should be
afforded prospective jurors, we feel it should be done by the
Legislature as they have done in the case of election officials.
Id. at 175.
84
Pennington, supra note 70, at 1602. Other recognized statutory or constitutional duties
include obeying a subpoena, testifying in a legal proceeding, and reporting abuse of
children, the elderly, patients, and institutionalized individuals. Rothstein, supra note 52, at
784.
85
See, e.g., Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Makovi v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179 (Md. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2000) (providing
federal protection of jurors’ employment serving on federal juries). “No employer shall
discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any permanent employee by reason
of such employee’s jury service, or the attendance or scheduled attendance in connection
with such service, in any court of the United States.” § 1875(a).
86
Venessa F. Kunmann-Marco, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Employment At-Will
Doctrine, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 339 (1992); see also Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795
S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. 1990) (explaining justification for whistleblower exception). The term
whistleblower:
derived from the act of an English bobby blowing his whistle upon
becoming aware of the commission of a crime to alert other law
enforcement officers and the public within the zone of danger. . . . Like
this corner law enforcement official, the whistleblower sounds the
alarm when wrongdoing occurs on his or her “beat,” which is usually
within a large organization.
Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 727 (citations omitted).
87
See Gutman, supra note 17, at 161.
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interest in control.88 Thus, many states and the federal government have
enacted legislation to protect whistleblowers who report their
employers.89
Several state and federal statutes, in addition to the whistleblower
protections, specifically prohibit firing an employee for exercising
existing state or federally granted constitutional or statutory rights.90
This public policy exception applies most often in cases where an
employee was fired for filing a workers compensation claim, which is a
state created statutory right.91 Employees looking to federal or state
constitutionally created rights are generally unsuccessful in asserting
claims, unless government action is involved.92
Notwithstanding the fact that one of the most fundamental
constitutionally created rights is the First Amendment’s freedom of
speech protection, few courts have found a public policy exception in
cases against private employers based on this constitutional provision,
choosing instead to adhere to the general principle that the First
Amendment protections are only applicable to government actions.93
88
Julie Jones, Comment, Give a Little Whistle: The Need for a More Broad Interpretation of the
Whistleblower Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1133, 1148
(2003); see also Kunmann-Marco, supra note 86, at 347.
89
Jones, supra note 88, at 1148 (2003). Almost all states and the federal government
recognize the whistleblower exception, but the extent to which it is applied varies greatly.
Id. One state, Virginia, does not recognize a whistleblower exception to the employmentat-will doctrine. Id. See also Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State
of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99 (2000) (discussing the various federal
statutory provisions protecting whistleblowers as well as the vast differences among state
statutory protections for whistleblowing).
90
Kim, supra note 65, at 678. Other federal laws prohibit employers from dismissing
employees for asserting certain statutory rights. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (2000) (stating that discrimination against or discharge of employee for
exercising rights under the NLRA is an “unfair labor practice”); Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to discharge an employee for filing a
complaint under the FLSA); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2000)
(forbidding the discharge of employee for filing complaint pursuant to OSHA); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000) (forbidding the discharge of an
employee for exercising ERISA rights); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)
(2000) (prohibiting discharge of any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful
by FMLA).
91
Pennington, supra note 70, at 1599.
92
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 775.
93
Id. at 775-76; see, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). In
Novosel the plaintiff was fired for refusing to participate in the lobbying effort of his
employer. 721 F.2d at 896. The plaintiff had privately stated his opposition to his
employer’s political stand. Id. The suit was brought as a wrongful discharge claim and the
plaintiff argued that his firing violated public policy. Id. The court, sitting in diversity
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Many courts refuse to create a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine for private sector employees who are fired
for exercising their free speech rights.94 For bloggers in the private
jurisdiction, interpreted Pennsylvania law and found that Pennsylvania recognized a
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. at 897-99. The court
interpreted Pennsylvania case law to allow for the exception under the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution, or the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 899. Thus, the
court held that there was “an important public policy is at stake . . . that Novosel’s
allegations state a claim . . . that Novosel’s complaint discloses no plausible and legitimate
reason for terminating his employment, and his discharge violates a clear mandate of
public policy.” Id. at 900. Since Novosel, Pennsylvania courts have not followed Novosel
and have not permitted a wrongful discharge cause of action under a constitutional
provision absent a showing of state action. See, e.g., Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 843-44 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986). In 1992, therefore, the Third Circuit found:
In light of the narrowness of the public policy exception and of the
Pennsylvania courts’ continuing insistence upon the state action
requirement, we predict that if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would not look to the First and Fourth Amendments as
sources of public policy when there is no state action.
Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir.1992). While the First
Amendment does protect the fundamental right of free speech, it only does so when a state
actor is infringing upon those rights. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 1069. Moreover, in
the employment context, public sector employees’ free speech rights are protected only
when they are speaking out on a matter of public concern. Id. at 1070. There is a three step
analysis for public employee’s free speech claims:
(1) The employee must prove that an adverse employment action was
motivated by the employee’s speech; if the employee does this, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the same action would have been taken anyway; (2) the
speech must be deemed to be a matter of public concern; (3) the court
must balance the employee’s speech rights against the employer’s
interest in the efficient functioning of the office.
Id. at 1071. The First Amendment has been applied to the states through the Fourteen
Amendment. See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The Fourteenth
Amendment states, in pertinent part, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
94
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1096; see, e.g., Wiegand v. Motiva Enter. LLC., 295 F.
Supp. 2d 465, 474-75 (D.N.J. 2003). In Wiegand, the plaintiff was fired after his employer
found out that he was selling racist, neo-nazi paraphernalia on his website. 295 F. Supp. 2d
at 470, 472. The plaintiff urged the court to adopt the third circuits ruling in Novosel v.
Nationwide Ins.Co.,721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d. Cir. 1983), where the court held that state statutory
free speech rights could be used as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine. Id. Without reaching a direct decision whether or not to apply Novosel, the court
held that:
[t]he First Amendment does not provide absolute protection for all
speech . . . and three of its limitations are relevant in this case, namely
the limitations based on commercial speech, on fighting words, and on
speech in the employment context. The issue here is not whether
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sector, application of this exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
requires demonstration that public policy is in favor of a blogger’s free
speech.95 Courts consistently decline to extend such a public policy to
free speech or interfere with a private employer’s discretion in this
area.96 As a result of judicial hesitancy to extend a public policy
exception to free speech, employees typically look to statutory mandates
to have their wrongful termination claims prevail.97 Several states have
enacted employment protections by means of lifestyle discrimination
statutes.98
C. Blogs and the Application of Legislative Employment Law:
Discrimination Statutes

Lifestyle

Lifestyle discrimination statutes protect an employee’s use of lawful
products or participation in lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or
speech.99 Specifically, lifestyle discrimination statutes usually protect
some form of lawful off-duty activity from intrusion by private sector
employers.100 For instance, statutes in thirty states and the District of
Columbia protect smokers, or others who use other lawful consumable
products from termination based solely on such activities.101 Although
plaintiff’s speech could form the basis of a First Amendment claim, but
is instead whether defendants’ restrictions on plaintiff’s speech
violated a “clear mandate of public policy.” This Court finds that it
did not because the speech was not “clearly protected” by the First
Amendment due to its nature as commercial hate speech regulated by
an employer.
Id. at 474-75.
95
Gutman, supra note 17, at 164.
96
Id.
Thus, the ‘‘strongest’’ of public policies may prove to hold no power
over private employers, unless the blogger can sufficiently
demonstrate that the blog is supported by that public policy, which is
problematic. Though there is a public policy in favor of free speech, it
is not an unfettered policy, and as such, it may not be enough to shield
the blogger’s job.
Id.
97
See infra Part II.C (discussing lifestyle discrimination statutes).
98
See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (discussing the kinds of lifestyle
discrimination statutes).
99
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 425 (Karen E. Ford et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); see
infra note 101 and accompanying text (listing the currently enacted lifestyle discrimination
statutes).
100
Ann L. Rives, Note, You’re Not the Boss of Me: A Call for Federal Lifestyle Discrimination
Legislation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 558 (2006).
101
NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., LIFESTYLE DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYER CONTROL OF LEGAL
OFF DUTY EMPLOYEE ACTIVITIES 12-13, http://workrights.org/issue_lifestyle/dbrief2.pdf
(last visited Aug. 9, 2007); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.02 (2006); CAL. LAB. CODE
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protections among the various statutory provisions vary widely from
state to state, there are two basic types of state statutes protecting
employees’ off-duty conduct.102 The first type of legislation protects
lawful use of consumable products.103 Quite distinctly, the second

§ 96(k) (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40s
(2003); D.C. CODE § 6-913.3 (2006); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5; IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-4-1
(West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040(1) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027
(2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1580-A (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (2007);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 290.145 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.333
(2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37-a (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 (West 2000); N.M.
STAT. § 50-11-3 (2006); N.Y. LAB. LAW. § 201-d (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2
(2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 500 (West 1999); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.315 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 23-20.10-14 (2006); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-1-85 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-95-60 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1427 (2006); VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-1504; W.V. CODE § 21-3-19 (2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.35 (West 2002); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105 (2006).
102
Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You are Not at Work?: Limiting the Use
of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
625, 640 (2004); Rives, supra note 100, at 556.
103
Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 640. Consumable product protection legislation came
into existence in the late 1980’s as a way of prohibiting employers from discriminating or
terminating employees for using lawful products during off duty hours. FUNDAMENTALS
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 99, at 425. Early on, the tobacco industry began lobbying
for laws to protect smokers from discrimination at work. Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 641.
Ms. Pagnattaro notes that the initial consumable products legislation gained support from
many diverse groups. Id. In fact, strong support came from “the American Civil Liberties
Union, organized labor, the National Association for the Advancement of Fat Acceptance,
the American Motorcycle Association, and the tobacco industry.” Id. The initial concern
was that employers would discriminate against smokers in favor of nonsmokers based on
their habits away from work, instead of their job qualifications or credentials.
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 99, at 425.
The Legislature finds and declares that regulation of smoking in the
workplace is a matter of statewide interest and concern. It is the intent
of the Legislature in enacting this section to prohibit the smoking of
tobacco products in all (100 percent of) enclosed places of employment
in this state, as covered by this section, thereby eliminating the need of
local governments to enact workplace smoking restrictions within their
respective jurisdictions. It is further the intent of the Legislature to
create a uniform statewide standard to restrict and prohibit the
smoking of tobacco products in enclosed places of employment, as
specified in this section, in order to reduce employee exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke to a level that will prevent anything
other than insignificantly harmful effects to exposed employees, and
also to eliminate the confusion and hardship that can result from
enactment or enforcement of disparate local workplace smoking
restrictions.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5. North Carolina, the home state of tobacco company R.J.
Reynolds, initially passed one of the most comprehensive consumable products laws.
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category protects other lawful off-duty conduct, activities, or speech.104
While none of the most comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes
specifically protect both at-will employees’ blogging activities and their
speech exercised within their blog, even when done off-duty, on
personal computers, and without materially effecting their employer’s
interests, lifestyle discrimination statutes are the most likely source of
protection.105 This Section examines the lifestyle discrimination statutes
that protect lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech.106
1.

Lawful Off-Duty Activity Protection

Broad lifestyle discrimination statutes that forbid discrimination
based on lawful off-duty conduct are few and far between.107 Five states,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and North Dakota,
provide the most comprehensive protection for an employee’s lawful offduty activities, conduct, or speech.108 An overview of the existing
Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 642. North Carolina’s statute, protecting public and private
employee’s right to use lawful consumable products states:
(a) As used in this section, “employer” means the State and all political
subdivisions of the State, public and quasi-public corporations, boards,
bureaus, commissions, councils, and private employers with three or
more regularly employed employees.
(b) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire a prospective employee, or discharge or otherwise
discriminate against any employee with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the prospective
employee or the employee engages in or has engaged in the lawful use
of lawful products if the activity occurs off the premises of the
employer during nonworking hours and does not adversely affect the
employee’s job performance or the person’s ability to properly fulfill
the responsibilities of the position in question or the safety of other
employees.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2005).
104
See infra Part II.C.1.
105
See infra Part II.C.1 (giving an overview of the most comprehensive lifestyle
discrimination statutes that protect lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech).
106
See infra notes 110-34 and accompanying text (discussing individual state’s
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes that protect off-duty conduct, activities, or
speech).
107
Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 377, 416 (2003).
108
See infra notes 110-30 and accompanying text (explaining the comprehensive lifestyle
discrimination statutes); see also Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 640. Ms. Pagnattaro notes
that this second category of lawful off-duty conduct statutes has a wide range of
protections. Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 640. The protections “range from California’s
very broad wording, to a narrower focus in Connecticut where private employees’ First
Amendment rights are protected against violations by their employers.” Id. “California,
New York, North Dakota and Colorado all have statutes that protect a broader range of
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comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes that protect an
employee’s lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech reveals the
expansive breadth some state legislatures have taken to protect an
employee’s life away from work.109
i.

California

California’s statute, one of the most expansive in the nation, protects
employee rights regarding off-duty conduct.110 California’s lifestyle
discrimination statute protects lawful off-duty conduct by giving both
employees and job applicants the right to bring a claim through the
state’s Labor Commissioner against employers.111 Based on a plain
language reading of the law, it protects all lawful off-duty conduct
without any exception and provides an expansive and comprehensive
shield for an employee’s off-duty rights.112 This expansive, plain
activity. . . . Connecticut protects employees who exercise certain federal and state
constitutional rights from adverse action by their employers.” Id. at 646.
109
See infra notes 110-30 and accompanying text (explaining state lifestyle discrimination
statutes that protect employees’ lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech).
110
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003).
The Labor Commissioner and his or her deputies and representatives
authorized by him or her in writing shall, upon the filing of a claim
therefore by an employee, or an employee representative authorized in
writing by an employee, with the Labor Commissioner, take
assignments of:
(k) Claims for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or
discharge from employment for lawful conduct occurring during
nonworking hours away from the employer’s premises.
§ 96(k).
111
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003); see also 1999 CAL. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 692
(Deering). Section one states the findings of the California legislature in enacting the law:
The Legislature finds and declares that, absent the protections afforded
to employees by the Labor Commissioner, an individual employee is
ill-equipped and unduly disadvantaged in any effort to assert the civil
rights otherwise guaranteed by Article I of the California Constitution.
The Legislature further finds and declares that allowing any employer
to deprive an employee of any constitutionally guaranteed civil
liberties, regardless of the rationale offered, is not in the public interest.
The Legislature further declares that this act is necessary to further the
state interest in protecting the civil rights of individual employees who
would not otherwise be able to protect themselves.
1999 CAL. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 692 (Deering).
112
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003); Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 647. Unlike
other state’s laws, California contains no exceptions to allow discrimination or termination
if the lawful activity conflicts with the employer’s business interest or creates a conflict of
interest. Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 647. “Not surprisingly, immediately after its
enactment, concerns arose about the scope of the statute and the ramifications for
employers in California.” Id. But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001); N.Y. LAB.
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language reading of the statute was short lived, however, as an early
interpretation by California’s Attorney General limited the scope to
reach only independently recognized constitutional or statutory rights.113
ii. Colorado
Unlike California’s expansive statute, Colorado’s statutory
protection for an employee’s off-duty conduct only prohibits restrictions
on non-work and off-duty activities.114
Colorado’s lifestyle
discrimination statute creates a right for employees to engage in lawful
off-duty activities.115 The right is not absolute, as the statute creates
exceptions that allow an employer to fire an employee for engaging in
lawful activities that are related to an occupational requirement or create
a conflict of interest.116 For instance, Colorado’s statute has been
interpreted to protect, and thus not to create a conflict of interest, when
an employee writes a critical letter to the newspaper about his or her
employer.117 However, Colorado’s statute, while protecting off-duty
LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002); N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2005) (providing
exceptions to the lawful off-duty conduct statutes).
113
83 Op. Att’y Gen. Cal. 226 (2000). “[S]ection 96 did not create new substantive rights
for employees. Rather, it established a procedural mechanism that allows the
Commissioner to assert, on behalf of employees, their independently recognized
constitutional rights.” Id.
114
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001).
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for an
employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to that
employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the
employer during nonworking hours unless such a restriction:
(a) Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably
and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities
of a particular employee or a particular group of employees, rather
than to all employees of the employer; or
(b) Is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any responsibilities
to the employer or the appearance of such a conflict of interest.
§ 24-34-402.5(1).
115
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001).
116
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001); supra notes 112, 114 (noting the
exceptions to the Colorado statute).
117
See Marsh v. Delta Airlines Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1464 (D. Colo. 1997).
In interpreting the plain meaning of the statute, the term conflict of
interest should be given its generally understood meaning; that is, that
it relates to “fiduciaries and their relationship to matters of private
interest or gain to them” or a “situation in which regard for one duty
tends to lead to disregard of another.”
Id. The court went on to find that despite the fact that the critical letter to the newspaper
created no conflict of interest under the statute, the employer was still justified in firing the
employee because the court found the letter breached an implied duty of loyalty because it
had nothing to do with a matter of public safety. Id.
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activities, still creates the possibility, using analogous case law, that an
employer can get around the statute by claiming the employee did not
address a matter of public concern.118
iii. Connecticut
Diverging from California and Colorado’s protections for lawful offduty activities, Connecticut provides broad protection for an employee
exercising federal or state constitutional rights.119 Connecticut enacted
its Free Speech Act to remedy the disparity between public sector
employees who enjoy First Amendment free speech protection when
commenting on matters of public concern and private sector at-will
employees who have no First Amendment protection in their
employment.120 The statute extends the same protection for free speech
that the First Amendment gives public employees, with the exception
See Marsh v. Delta Airlines Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997).
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (2003).
Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political
subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or
discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights
guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution
or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state,
provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere
with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the working
relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to
such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge,
including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney’s fees as part
of the costs of any such action for damages. If the court determines
that such action for damages was brought without substantial
justification, the court may award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees
to the employer.
§ 31-51q.
120
Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private
Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537, 1581 (1998); see also
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 463 (discussing freedom of expression in employment
law).
Public employee freedom of expression is protected by the First
Amendment. In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the
Supreme Court established a three-party test to determine whether the
discharge of a public employee was made on the basis of protected
speech. First, the employee must be speaking on a matter of public
concern. Second, the court must balance the interests of the employee,
as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern against the
government employer’s interest in running an efficient operation.
Third, the employee’s protected conduct must be a motivating factor in
the government employer’s decision to discharge. The third element,
causation, is a question for the trier of fact only if the court has
resolved the first two elements in favor of the employee.
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 463-64.
118
119

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 8

272

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

that the speech is not protected if it substantially or materially interferes
with the employee’s job.121
iv. New York
Contrasting Connecticut’s Free Speech Act, New York’s labor code
provides employees with protection for off-duty activities in specific
circumstances.122 New York protects four categories of off-duty conduct
for which an employer is not able to discriminate against job applicants
or terminate employees because of participation in the protected
categories of off-duty conduct.123
Under the New York statute,
employers maintain the right to discriminate against job applicants or
terminate employees at-will when the protected conduct would cause a
material conflict of interest related to trade secrets, proprietary

121
122

Eule & Varat, supra note 120, at 1581.
See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002).
2. Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for any
employer or employment agency to refuse to hire, employ or license,
or to discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate against an
individual in compensation, promotion or terms, conditions or
privileges of employment because of:
a. an individual’s political activities outside of working hours, off of
the employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s equipment
or other property, if such activities are legal, provided, however, that
this paragraph shall not apply to persons whose employment is
defined in paragraph six of subdivision (a) of section seventy-nine-h of
the civil rights law, and provided further that this paragraph shall not
apply to persons who would otherwise be prohibited from engaging in
political activity pursuant to chapter 15 of title 5 and subchapter III of
chapter 73 of title 5 of the USCA;
b. an individual’s legal use of consumable products prior to the
beginning or after the conclusion of the employee’s work hours, and
off of the employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s
equipment or other property;
c. an individual’s legal recreational activities outside work hours, off of
the employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s equipment
or other property; or
d. an individual’s membership in a union or any exercise of rights
granted under Title 29, USCA, Chapter 7 or under article fourteen of
the civil service law.

Id.
123
See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002) (listing protected conduct as political
activities, use of legal consumable products, legal recreational activities, and union
membership). Recreational activities are defines as “any lawful, leisure-time activity, for
which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally engaged in for
recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading
and the viewing of television, movies and similar material.” Id. at § 201-d(1)(b).
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information, or business interests.124 Furthermore, only recreational
activities are protected, rather than any lawful activity or conduct. Thus,
the New York statute is narrower than those of other states by protecting
only conduct categorized as recreational.125
v.

North Dakota

As opposed to only protecting recreational activities, North Dakota’s
statutory protection of lawful off-duty activities is part of the state’s antidiscrimination and human rights statutory provisions.126 North Dakota’s

See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(3)(a) (McKinney 2002) (stating “the provisions of
subdivision two of this section shall not be deemed to protect activity which: creates a
material conflict of interest related to the employer’s trade secrets, proprietary information
or other proprietary or business interest”).
125
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1100; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003)
(protecting lawful conduct); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001) (protecting lawful
activities); N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2005) (protecting lawful participation in lawful
activities).
126
Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 659; see N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2005).
It is the policy of this state to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, the presence of any
mental or physical disability, status with regard to marriage or public
assistance, or participation in lawful activity off the employer’s
premises during nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with
the essential business-related interests of the employer; to prevent and
eliminate
discrimination
in
employment
relations,
public
accommodations, housing, state and local government services, and
credit transactions; and to deter those who aid, abet, or induce
discrimination or coerce others to discriminate.
§14-02.4-01; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005).
It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire a
person; to discharge an employee; or to accord adverse or unequal
treatment to a person or employee with respect to application, hiring,
training, apprenticeship, tenure, promotion, upgrading, compensation,
layoff, or a term, privilege, or condition of employment, because of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or mental
disability, status with respect to marriage or public assistance, or
participation in lawful activity off the employer’s premises during
nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential
business-related interests of the employer. It is a discriminatory
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to make reasonable
accommodations for an otherwise qualified person with a physical or
mental disability or because of that person’s religion. This chapter
does not prohibit compulsory retirement of any employee who has
attained sixty-five years of age, but not seventy years of age, and who,
for the two-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in
a bona fide executive or high policymaking position, if the employee is
entitled to an immediate nonforfeiture annual retirement benefit from
a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation plan, or
124
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broad lifestyle discrimination statute applies to both employees and job
applicants, prohibiting employers from engaging in discriminatory
practices because of a job applicant or employee’s participation in lawful
off-duty activities.127 The statute contains an exception for which
protection is not extended if the activity is in direct conflict with an
employer’s essential business related interest.128 The requirement that
the activity be in direct conflict with an essential business interest affords
employees engaged in blogging activities broader protection than states
that provide an exception when there is a mere appearance of a conflict
of interest or a material conflict of interest.129 In application, North
Dakota courts do not give the statute an expansive definitional
reading.130
In sum, California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and North
Dakota maintain legislation needed to provide employees with a better
balance of bargaining power and to protect their off-duty conduct and
privacy, yet more protection is needed in the case of at-will employee
bloggers.131 Turning back to the issue of protecting lawful off-duty
conduct, comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes are necessary to
protect bloggers’ online activities and free speech rights.132 Such
protection is necessary because courts have been particularly unwilling
to carve out a free speech public policy exception to the employment-atwill doctrine.133
Furthermore, the current lifestyle discrimination
statutes do not lend reliable protection to bloggers.134 Bloggers must
now turn to their state legislatures to pass or expand statutory protection

any combination of those plans, of the employer of the employee,
which equal, in the aggregate, at least forty-four thousand dollars.
§ 14-02.4-03.
127
See N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2005); N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005).
128
See N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005).
129
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1101; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)
(2001).
130
Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 662.
131
Rives, supra note 100, at 568. Ms. Rives notes that employees are often left with no
other choice but to allow their employee to control their off duty conduct or seek
employment elsewhere. Id. The problem is that the job market has become more
specialized, leaving many employees without job alternatives. Id.
132
See infra Part III.A (discussing why at-will employee bloggers’ speech should be
protected).
133
See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (explaining judicial reluctance to
acknowledge a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine for free speech
rights).
134
See infra Part III.C (examining some states’ lifestyle discrimination statutes).
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for lawful off-duty activities or conduct and the speech that is associated
with it.135
III. ANALYSIS
Without statutory authority, courts are reluctant to carve out public
policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.136 Lifestyle
discrimination statutes, which protect lawful off-duty activities, conduct,
or speech are inadequate to protect at-will employee bloggers because
the statutes lack protection for both the act of blogging and the speech
that necessarily accompanies blogging.137 This loophole in lifestyle
discrimination statutes must be closed in order to proactively address
the issues that blogging technology presents.138 Furthermore, the public
policies behind lifestyle discrimination statutes favor protecting both
lawful off-duty employee activities or conduct and the speech associated
with it. Thus, state legislatures should consider the benefits of protecting
at-will employee bloggers’ lawful off-duty activities and the online
speech associated with their blogging activities.139
First, this Part explains why at-will employee bloggers’ online
speech should be protected.140 Second, this Part discusses why lifestyle
discrimination statutes are the solution for protecting at-will employee
bloggers’ lawful off-duty blogging activities.141 Finally, this Part
identifies the loopholes in the currently enacted lifestyle discrimination
statutes.142

See infra Parts III.A-B (discussing why at-will employee bloggers’ speech should be
protected and the need for legislation to protect the speech).
136
See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text (discussing the employment-at-will
doctrine and the narrow public policy exceptions courts currently recognize).
137
See infra Part III.C (discussing weakness in individual state lifestyle discrimination
statutes).
138
Wendy N. Davis, FEAR OF BLOGGING: As the Law Catches up to Technology, Bloggers
Look for a Few Good Attorneys, 91 A.B.A. J. 16 (2005).
139
David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee
Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 49 (1998).
140
See infra Part III.A (explaining the policy of lifestyle discrimination statutes is not
furthered if the statutes are not applicable to employee bloggers); see also Terry Ann
Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for Reform, 17 SETON
HALL L. REV. 42, 70 (1987) (discussing why employees free speech should be protected).
141
See infra Part III.B (explaining why legislation is needed in light of the courts
unwillingness to recognize a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine
that would include free speech).
142
See infra Part III.C (explaining the loopholes that employee bloggers face under the
current comprehensive lifestyles discrimination statutes).
135
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A. Why Protect Bloggers’ Online Speech?
The employment-at-will doctrine, in theory, gives both the employer
and employee the right to terminate the relationship without
justification, at any time.143 In reality, the employer controls the
employment relationship because the employer, many times, can more
easily afford the loss.144 Consequently, employees’ speech is chilled
when there is no protection for their off-duty expression.145 As applied
to blogs, the ambiguities in most lifestyle discrimination statutes do not
guarantee that the activity of blogging will be protected, much less the
speech that necessarily accompanies the blogging activities.146 First
Amendment protections for employee bloggers are unclear because the
protections seem dependant on varying standards associated with
different tort actions or the employment-at-will doctrine.147 With few
employers enacting official blogging policies, many employees have no
clear guidance to conform their conduct within the law, as the “law” is
murky and unsettled.148 To compensate for this legal ambiguity,
consideration of public policy protections for at-will employee bloggers
is necessary.149
Protection should be afforded to at-will employee bloggers in order
to promote the policies lifestyle discrimination statutes were originally
intended to advance.150
Furthermore, the policies that support
Halbert, supra note 140, at 70.
Id. Under the employment at-will doctrine, the employment relationship technically
can be ended at will by either the employer or the employee; however, because an
employee relies on the monetary and non-monetary benefits of having a job, the employer
is able to exercise great power over the relationship. Id. Job loss is hard on employees
particularly, because of the loss of wages but also because “loss of both seniority and
pension benefits as well as the intangible hardships associated with obtaining another job.”
Id.
145
Yamada, supra note 139, at 50. Mr. Yamada notes that employee’s experience whose
free speech is not protected “creates the kind of uncertainty and ambiguity that in some
ways may inhibit free speech.” Id.
146
See supra Part II.1 (describing the protections of the currently enacted lifestyle
discrimination statutes); Part III.C (describing the shortcomings of the currently enacted
lifestyle discrimination statutes as applied to bloggers).
147
See supra Parts II.A.2-3 (discussing First Amendment and state tort protections for
wrongful discharge actions).
148
See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty bloggers face
in employment law); see also note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Sun Microsystems
and Yahoo’s blogging policies).
149
See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (identifying the public policy reasons
lifestyle discrimination statutes were passed).
150
See Yamada, supra note 139, at 49. The policies that support free speech serve an
important function:
143
144
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protecting an employee’s lawful off-duty activities similarly support
protecting an employee’s blogging activities; however, blogging
inherently has two components, the act of having and maintaining a blog
and the speech written within the blog.151 The problem of potentially
protecting only the lawful off-duty activity of blogging, while not
protecting the blogger’s speech, creates a loophole for employers who
wish to discriminate against bloggers.152 The loophole must be closed in
order for lifestyle discrimination statutes to satisfy their intended
purpose: to keep employers from controlling employees’ lawful off-duty
activities.153 Otherwise, without protecting a blogger’s speech, the
activity of blogging is left virtually without protection, which is
counterintuitive of the policies supporting lifestyle discrimination
statutes.154 Courts have taken a deferential position to employers when
it comes to carving out public policy exceptions to the employment-atit would encourage ‘‘discovering the truth, through exposure to all the
facts, open discussion, and testing of opinions.’’ Second, it would
promote a participatory, democratic culture within the workplace.
Third, the statute would help to strike a ‘‘balance between stability and
movement’’ by allowing for a constructive, open discussion of
employees’ grievances and suggestions. Finally, it would nurture
individual fulfillment by affirming the dignity of each worker. These
basic functions would be reflected in two broad policy objectives: (1)
encouraging free speech and empowering workers; and (2) building a
more productive, participatory workforce.
Id.
151
See infra notes 168-95 and accompanying text (discussing lifestyle discrimination
statues and the loopholes as applied to bloggers). But see Eule & Varat, supra note 120, at
1602 (addressing the problems that courts may have in applying First Amendment
principles to private actor fact situations).
The legislative adoption of a statute tethered to the First Amendment
also leaves the judiciary strangely paralyzed in its interpretative role.
These statutes require courts to apply the identical standard to private
actors that is applied to public officials. Yet, the contours of the First
Amendment were developed in the context of protecting private actors
against the government. The government has no free speech rights of
its own. While the all-or-nothing dichotomy between public and
private that marks the state action doctrine may be conceptually
flawed, it does not follow that there are no differences between public
and private actors. The legislative leveling in these statutes denies the
judiciary the opportunity to take account of unique redistributional
effects.
Id.
152
See infra Part III.C (examining the various loopholes for employee bloggers in state
lifestyle discrimination statutes).
153
See infra Part III.B (discussing why legislation is needed to protect bloggers under
lifestyle discrimination statutes).
154
See infra Part III.C (discussing protections under current lifestyle discrimination
statutes).
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will doctrine.155 It is now up to the state legislatures and the political
process to remedy and support the policies behind protecting lawful offduty activities, such as blogging.156
B. Legislation is the Answer to Protecting Bloggers’ Online Speech
Courts for too long have enhanced the inherent bias of the
employment-at-will doctrine.157 In light of the blatant judicial decisions
that do not recognize a public policy exception to the employment-atwill doctrine to protect free speech, state legislatures must step in and
remedy what the courts have not.158
A comprehensive lifestyle
discrimination statute protecting both the act of blogging and the speech
within the blog would adequately protect at-will employee bloggers
from their employers’ control while off-duty.159
Looking back at the currently recognized public policy exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine, it is unlikely that any of the public
policy exceptions would provide protection for at-will employee
bloggers.160 The applicability of the exception for refusing to commit an
illegal act is limited because of the few situations in which blogging
would a constitute refusal to commit an illegal or fraudulent act.161
Furthermore, bloggers have no statutorily or constitutionally created
duties related to blogging, making the application of the public policy

155
See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text (discussing application of the public
policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine).
156
See Halbert, supra note 140, at 55. There courts are uneven in interpreting public
policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. Legislature enactment is the
remedy to this problem because “courts will look to statutory law in order to determine
whether or not they are confronting a clearly mandated public policy.” Id. at 56. At-will
employee bloggers are specifically in need of protection because blogging necessarily has
an activity component, which is the actual setting up and maintenance of a blog, and a
speech component for the content of a blog. Without protecting both the activity
component and the speech component, an at-will employee blogger is left without
protection for at least one aspect of her blog.
157
Halbert, supra note 140, at 72. “[T]he judicial response to the problem of first
amendment rights is the workplace has been either to exacerbate it or to alleviate it
tentatively and unevenly.” Id.
158
Yamada, supra note 139, at 35. Mr. Yamada discusses the importance of extending free
speech protection to all employees through statutory rather than judicial opinions. Id.
“The best forum for this discussion, however, is not the courtroom, but rather the
legislature.” Id.
159
See infra Part IV (proposing a model lifestyle discrimination statute that would protect
at-will employee bloggers).
160
See supra Parts II.B.1-2.
161
See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine for refusal to commit an illegal act).
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exception for statutory and constitutional duties not likely to apply.162
While bloggers in some instances may expose corporate wrongdoing on
their blogs, the whistleblower protections are not likely to cover bloggers
who take no further steps to report the wrongdoing to officials.163 At
first glance, the public policy exception grounded in freedom of speech
rights would seem to be the strongest argument for bloggers to make;
however, courts consistently deny this public policy exception or
interfere with a private employer’s discretion in this area without a clear
statutory mandate to the contrary.164 Leaving behind the inadequacies of
the public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, other
public policy arguments exist for taking proactive steps, such as enacting
legislation to deal with issues that follow the popularity of new
technology.165
When new technology surfaces, such as the blog, the legislature
should be proactive instead of reactive to the legal problems.166 In order
to be proactive in the case of at-will employee bloggers, the legislature
must construct a lifestyle discrimination statute that would protect
blogging as well as the speech associated with it.167 Furthermore, the fact
that many state legislatures have passed some form of a lifestyle
discrimination statute demonstrates a commitment to policies of giving
employees protection in their life away from work. However, there is a
need to close the loopholes that fail to protect bloggers in many lifestyle
discrimination statutes.168 If the policy behind lifestyle discrimination
statutes is to promote tolerance of lawful, off-duty behavior and prohibit
discrimination based on that lawful, off-duty conduct, activity, or
speech, then to effectively promote that policy the legislature must
eliminate the ambiguity in statutes that arguably protect either the

162
See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (explaining the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine for statutory and constitutional duties).
163
See notes 86-89 and accompanying text (examining the whistleblower protections
available to employees).
164
See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (discussing the courts refusal to extend
public policy exceptions for free speech).
165
See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (discussing the public policies behind
lifestyle discrimination statutes).
166
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the growing problems blogs are causing in
employment relationships and the uncertainty of employment rights).
167
Davis, supra note 138, at 16. Ms. Davis notes that blogs have created a new set of legal
issues and “[t]he legal community hasn’t been swift to respond, but such is the way with
new technologies: The law will be developed only after problems arise.” Id.
168
See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (defining what lifestyle discrimination
statutes protect and stating that thirty states and the District of Columbia have some form
of lifestyle discrimination statute).
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conduct of blogging, or the speech within a blog, but not both.169
Legislation is needed to give employers and employees a clear mandate
of what is required in this area of employment law.170 Thus, an at-will
employee blogger’s online speech is protected, if at all, through the
addition of a lifestyle discrimination statute that specifically protects
lawful off-duty speech and activities.171
C. The Existing Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes Leave Loopholes for
Bloggers
Of the few states that have enacted comprehensive lifestyle
discrimination statutes that specifically protect lawful off-duty activities,
conduct, or speech, none adequately protect both speech and conduct.172
Thus, an employee blogger is left in a statutory loophole that needs a
remedy to support the policies that led the legislature to enact the
statutes in the first place.173 This Section compares the protections
afforded for lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech among the
various lifestyle discrimination statutes that are currently enacted.174
1.

California

The comprehensive lifestyle discrimination legislation in California
has been narrowed through interpretation to only protect rights that are
already constitutionally or statutorily recognized.175 The strength of a
law to protect an employee’s lawful off-duty activities, in California, is
overcome by its weakness of only providing a means of addressing
rights that an employee already possesses.176 As such, at-will employees,
169
See Davis, supra note 138, at 16; see also infra Part III.C (analyzing weaknesses in state
lifestyle discrimination statutes).
170
Yamada, supra note 139, at 50. Furthermore, a lifestyle discrimination statute that
protects conduct and speech “can provide a more favorable climate for both individual and
collective employee activity.” Id. at 51.
171
See infra Part IV (setting out a model lifestyle discrimination statute to close the
loophole for at-will employee bloggers).
172
See infra Parts III.C.1-5 (analyzing individual state’s lifestyle discrimination statutes).
173
Yamada, supra note 139, at 49.
174
See infra Parts III.C.1-5 (examining California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and
North Dakota’s lifestyle discrimination statutes and the loopholes in each as applied to atwill employee bloggers).
175
See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (explaining California’s lifestyle
discrimination statute).
176
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103 (discussing the effectiveness of the statute with
regard to lawfully blogging employees). The employees that are working at-will least
benefit from a law that only protects established constitutional or statutory rights. Leaving
them with very little, if any, established constitutional or statutory rights. See supra Part
II.B (discussing the employment-at-will doctrine).
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without constitutional or statutory protection for freedom of speech, are
not adequately protected under California’s law when engaging in
lawful off-duty blogging.177 Expanding the statute to include lawful offduty activities that specifically include protection for off-duty speech
would better support at-will employees who blog under California’s
statute.178
2.

Colorado

Likewise, Colorado’s statutory protection for an employee’s off-duty
conduct has been narrowly interpreted.179 For instance, this narrow
interpretation leaves Colorado’s lifestyle discrimination statute unable to
protect an employee’s letters to a newspaper editor if the employer is
able to claim that the letter had nothing to do with a matter of public
concern.180 This interpretation would lend an analogy to bloggers
engaged in the activity of lawful off-duty blogging on their own
equipment, in which the employer is able to get around the statutory
protection by claiming that the blog did not address matters of public
concern.181 The drawback for bloggers under the Colorado law is twofold.182 First, the law only protects current employees, thus applicants
are not protected against discrimination.183 Under the Colorado law,
employers are presumably free to discriminate among applicants

177
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103 (noting “that the existing legal framework
generally provides very little protection to those employees that seek to engage in
conversations by means of blogging during their off-duty time”); see also William A.
Clineburg, Jr. & Peter N. Hall, Addressing Blogging By Employees, NAT’L L.J., June 6, 2005,
available at http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/nlfblogging.pdf (discussing private sector
employees rights when blogging).
Unfortunately, the protection that immediately suggests itself to most
bloggers—the First Amendment—is in actuality no protection at all for
most of them. Employees of state and federal governments may be
protected by the First Amendment if they are opining on a matter of
public concern. But private-sector employees do not enjoy the same
protection.
Clineburg & Hall, supra.
178
See supra Part III.B (discussing the need for lifestyle discrimination legislation to
protect employee bloggers).
179
See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing the narrow interpretation of
Colorado’s statute).
180
See Marsh v. Delta Airlines Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1464 (D. Colo. 1997); supra notes
114-18 and accompanying text (explaining Colorado’s lifestyle discrimination statute).
181
See Marsh v. Delta Airlines Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997).
182
See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado’s lifestyle
discrimination statute).
183
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1100; Rives, supra note 100, at 559.
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because of the applicant’s blogging activities.184 Second, while the law
would likely protect the activity of blogging, it does not necessarily
protect the blogger’s online speech.185 As such, under the Colorado law,
in order to protect at-will employee bloggers’ activity and speech, there
is a need to expand the scope of the law to create specific protection for
the activity of blogging, as well as the speech that necessarily
accompanies it.186
3.

Connecticut

Unlike Colorado’s statute which protects activities but not speech,
Connecticut’s lifestyle discrimination statute protections speech, but not
activities.187 Connecticut’s statutory weakness is that it does not protect
any lawful off-duty activities, including the activity of blogging.188 An
additional weakness lies in that the statute only grants protection to the
same extent that public sector employees have protection under the First
Amendment.189 As such, only matters that deal with public concern
would be protected, greatly narrowing the protected subject matter of a
private sector, at-will employee’s blog.190 Thus, in order to better protect
at-will employee bloggers, under the Connecticut statute, there is a need
to expand the protections beyond the parallel protection of the First
Amendment freedoms public sector employees enjoy, and to include
protection for lawful, off-duty activities.191 Adding protection for lawful
off-duty activities, as well as additional speech protections beyond First
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2001) (defining the unlawful practice to only
include “terminating the employment of any employee”).
185
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103 (noting, “that the existing legal framework
generally provides very little protection to those employees that seek to engage in
conversations by means of blogging during their off-duty time”); see also Clineburg & Hall,
supra note 177 (discussing private sector employees rights when blogging).
186
See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text (discussing the need for legislation to
protect an employee blogger’s online speech).
187
See supra note 119 (quoting Connecticut’s statute).
188
See Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 670 (summarizing the statute’s protection “only
where a private employee is expressing concern about a public matter will the Connecticut
statute protect against adverse employment action”).
189
See supra notes 119-21 (discussing the protections of Connecticut’s statute). Public
sector employees are only protected if their speech reflects a matter of public concern. As
such, at-will employee bloggers who blog about other issues are not protected if their blog
is not deemed to be a matter of public concern.
190
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (discussing a matter of public concern
as, “relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community”); supra
note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for public employee’s free
speech protection).
191
See supra Part III.C (discussing the need to create legislation that would adequately
protect employee bloggers).
184
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Amendment freedoms would still, under the Connecticut law, protect
the employer’s interest when the subject matter substantially or
materially interferes with the workplace.192
4.

New York

Under New York’s lifestyle discrimination statutory scheme,
protection is extended to lawful recreational activities, which would
most likely cover off-duty blogging on the employee’s own equipment as
a recreational activity such as a hobby.193 The weakness in the New York
statute is the inherent vagueness and ambiguity in categorizing those
activities that are recreational activities.194 This ambiguity may give
employers an argument that blogging should not be considered a
recreational activity.195 Additionally, New York courts have narrowly
interpreted the definition of what is protected as a recreational activity,
which may signal the likely acceptance of an argument not to protect
blogging as a recreational activity.196 The disagreement among people as
to how to define a blog creates more uncertainty because there is little
concrete guidance for the courts to look to in making a determination as
to whether blogging is a recreational activity.197 While a statute that
protects all lawful off-duty activities and its accompanying speech
would certainly protect bloggers, only protecting recreational activities
without specific speech protections does not necessarily lead to that
conclusion.198 Even if bloggers were protected under New York’s
recreational activity definition, the speech aspect of blogging would not
be protected.199 In order to afford protection to New York’s at-will
See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (explaining Connecticut’s statute).
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1102.
194
See supra note 123 (defining recreational activities under New York’s statute).
195
Pagnattaro, supra note 102, at 654. Ms. Pagnattaro notes that political activity cases are
straight forward and relatively clear to categorize, but recreational activities, of which the
most litigation has been over personal relationships, created “an early division of opinion
between the state and fedral courts in New York.” Id. See also State v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (finding dating relationship was not a
recreational activity). Thus, the ambiguity in defining a recreational activity “leaves a large
hole in its protection of employee privacy.” Rives, supra note 100, at 563.
196
See, e.g., State v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(limiting “the statutory protection to certain clearly defined categories of leisure-time
activities”).
197
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing the disagreement among
authors as to the definition and purpose a blog).
198
See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (discussing New York’s statute and the
activities to which it applies).
199
See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002); Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103
(noting “that the existing legal framework generally provides very little protection to those
employees that seek to engage in conversations by means of blogging during their off-duty
192
193
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employee bloggers, there is a need to protect the speech within a blog
and the activity of blogging within the purview of defined recreational
activities or more generally within lawful, off-duty activities.200
5.

North Dakota

North Dakota’s effort to remedy discrimination of lawful off-duty
activities was enacted as part of the state’s anti-discrimination and
human rights statutory provisions.201 The weakness in this statute is the
uncertainty as to exactly which lawful activities will be afforded
protection and which will not because of an exception or narrow
interpretation of the statute.202 Assuming blogging is done off-duty,
lawfully, and off the employer’s premises, the North Dakota law would
seemingly afford broad protection to at-will employee bloggers, unless
the blogging was in direct conflict with an essential business related
interest of the employer.203 However, an at-will employee’s speech
within the blog would not be adequately protected under the North
Dakota law, primarily because the speech could be considered a separate
aspect of the blogging activities.204
Employment law’s jurisprudential future is best served with an eye
toward anticipating the legal issues blogs present in this arena. Thus,
protecting at-will employees’ lawful, off-duty activities or conduct and
the speech associated with it, would necessarily encompass blogging and
provide certainty and uniformity within employment law where the
public policy exceptions to the judicially enforced employment-at-will
doctrine and the loopholes of the legislatively enacted lifestyle
discrimination statutes have not.205

time”); see also Clineburg & Hall, supra note 177 (discussing private sector employees rights
when blogging).
200
See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (explaining the need to proactively
legislate to protect at-will employee bloggers under lifestyle discrimination statutes).
201
See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (explaining North Dakota’s lifestyle
discrimination statute).
202
Rives, supra note 100, at 561 (noting the ambiguous language of the statute gives
employers little guidance as to what activities an employee can and cannot be fired for).
203
See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (explaining North Dakota’s lifestyle
discrimination statute).
204
Gely & Bierman, supra note 30, at 1103 (noting, “that the existing legal framework
generally provides very little protection to those employees that seek to engage in
conversations by means of blogging during their off-duty time”); see also Clineburg & Hall,
supra note 177 (discussing private sector employees’ rights when blogging).
205
See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (explaining the need for lifestyle
discrimination statutes that protect speech as well as conduct or activities).
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IV. CONTRIBUTION
Protecting at-will employee bloggers’ online speech and the activity
or conduct of having a blog is necessary to bring bloggers under the
protection of lifestyle discrimination statutes that are aimed at protecting
lawful off-duty activities, conduct, or speech.206 Language providing
protection for the speech associated with lawful off-duty activities or
conduct is the crucial element that the current lifestyle discrimination
statutory language is lacking in order to protect at-will employee
bloggers.207 Without protection for a blogger’s speech, the activity of
having and maintaining a blog is not adequately protected under the
current lifestyle discrimination statutes aimed at protecting lawful offduty activities or conduct.208 The policy of protecting an employee’s
lawful off-duty activities and conduct is advanced when legislatures
protect the speech associated with the activities or conduct, such as
protecting an employee blogger’s speech.209 This Note proposes the
following model lifestyle discrimination statute with the additional
protections for speech associated with lawful off-duty activities or
conduct.210
A. Proposed Model Comprehensive Lifestyle Discrimination Statute211
The following model lifestyle discrimination statute proposes a way
to advance the policies behind lifestyle discrimination legislation.212
See supra Parts III.C.1-5 (examining lifestyle discrimination statutes that have a
loophole in which at-will employee bloggers could slip through without protection).
207
See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (discussing the need to enact lifestyle
discrimination legislation to protect lawful off-duty activities and conduct as well as the
speech that is associated with such activities).
208
See supra Parts III.C.1-5 (discussing the loopholes in the current lifestyle
discrimination statutes).
209
See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (discussing the policy reasons behind
lifestyle discrimination statutes that protect lawful off duty activities).
210
See infra Part IV.A (providing protection for lawful off-duty conduct, activities, or
speech). By protecting the speech that is associated with the lawful off-duty conduct or
activity an employee blogger’s speech is adequately protected because a bloggers speech in
necessarily associated with the activity of blogging.
211
This model lifestyle discrimination statute is based on COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5
(2001) (defining as an unlawful employment practice the prohibition of legal activities as a
condition of employment). The writing that is struck through indicates portions of the
Colorado statute that the author would take out. The proposed additional protections are
italicized and are the contributions of the author.
212
See supra Part III (explaining the need for the legislature to enact a comprehensive
lifestyle discrimination statute in order to adequately protect at-will employees because of
the deference courts give to employers and the courts’ unwillingness to carve out
additional public policy exceptions).
206
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Additionally, this proposed model statute would protect employee
bloggers’ lawful off-duty activities or the conduct of having and
maintaining a blog and the speech associated with the blog.213
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice for
any employer to refuse to hire an applicant, demote, or to terminate
the employment of any employee, or to fail or refuse to promote or
upgrade an employee, due to that applicant’s or employee’s
engaging in any lawful activity or conduct or speech associated with
the protected activity or conduct when done off the premises of the
employer during nonworking hours unless such a restriction:
a.

Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is
reasonably and rationally related to the employment
activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a
particular group of employees, rather than to all employees
of the employer; or

b. Is necessary to avoid a bona fide and actual conflict of interest
with any responsibilities of the employer or the appearance
of such a conflict of interest.
Commentary
The proposed model comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute
makes clear that it is applicable to all employers.214 Additionally, the
proposed model statute protects applicants and employees.215 This
protection serves to protect applicants from discrimination for their
lawful online blogging activities and the speech associated with those
activities. Likewise, it also protects employees from discrimination for
their lawful off-duty online blogging activities or speech associated with
those activities. The statute extends protection to employees not only
from adverse firings, but also from discrimination in promotions or
upgrades.216 The statute specifically protects only those activities that
are done lawfully, off-duty, and away from the employer’s premises.217
213
See infra text accompanying § (1) (expanding protection for lawful off-duty activities
or conduct and the speech associated with such conduct).
214
See supra text accompanying § 1 (extending statutory coverage to any employer).
215
See supra text accompanying § 1 (extending statutory protection to applicants for hire).
216
See supra text accompanying § 1 (protecting employees from adverse firings and
failure to promote or upgrade).
217
The reasoning behind having the statutory protection extend only to activities or
conduct that is done off the employer’s premises is to take potential claims out of the realm
of being done on company time. Furthermore, other adequate protections govern activities
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The amendment to the conflict of interest section takes the ambiguity out
of what may create an “appearance of a conflict of interest” by only
excluding from statutory protection actual, established conflicts of
interest.218 Employee bloggers will benefit from the actual conflict of
interest requirement because it forces the employer to show an actual
conflict of interest created by the employee’s blog.219
(2) The rights defined in § (1) are the individual rights of the applicant or
employee, and are independent of, and not dependant on any other
rights of the applicant or employee.
Commentary
Additionally, the proposed model statute makes clear that the rights
protected under the statute are independent of any other rights already
held by the applicant or employee.220 This statutory language is
important to protect an at-will employee blogger’s speech because it
discredits any argument that the speech protected is dependant on only
that speech which would be protected by the federal or a state
constitution.221 Furthermore, this protection serves to eliminate the
possibility that statutory interpretation would narrow the scope of
protection to only those rights, if any, which are already substantively
recognized for employee bloggers.222

done on the employer’s property and during company time like the federal Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, which is outside the scope of this Note. The essence of
lifestyle discrimination statutes is adherence to the limitation that the activity, conduct, or
speech is done off-duty.
218
See supra § (1)(b); see also supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing
Colorado’s lifestyle discrimination statute).
219
See supra § (1)(b) (creating the necessity for an employer to show an actual conflict of
interest).
220
See supra § (2). This addition in the statute is intended to remedy the potential for
judicial interpretation to characterize the statute as remedial protection for rights that an
employee already has; see also supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing
California’s lifestyle discrimination statute and its narrow interpretation).
221
See supra § (2). This text alleviates the potential of having a narrow interpretation of
the statute, like the narrow view adopted for California’s lifestyle discrimination statute.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing California’s Attorney General
opinion that narrowed the potential scope of the California lifestyle discrimination statute).
222
See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing the narrow scope of
California’s lifestyle discrimination statute). By clearly indicating that the statute is
creating new substantive rights for employees, the possibility that interpretation would
narrow the use of the statute to only a procedural mechanism for protecting already
existing rights is eliminated. There is a need for this clarity because the possibility of such
an interpretation would leave blogging employees without protection for their speech
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(3) The remedy for any person claiming to be aggrieved under § (1) by a
discriminatory or unfair employment practice as defined in § (1) shall
be as follows: He may bring a civil suit for damages in any state
court of competent jurisdiction and may sue for all wages and
benefits which would have been due him up to and including
the date of judgment had the discriminatory or unfair
employment practice not occurred; except that nothing in this
section shall be construed as to relieve such person from the
obligation to mitigate his damages.223
(4) The court shall award the prevailing party any person claiming to
be aggrieved under § (1) court costs and a reasonable attorney fee if
that person prevails in his cause of action under § (1).224
Commentary
The statute also provides an independent right of action for
applicants and employees to enforce these rights for remedies under civil
law.225 This protection serves to avoid litigation over whether the statute
provides for a private right of action. Finally, only those persons
claiming to be aggrieved as applicants or employees are permitted
awards of attorney fees or court costs.226 Providing attorney’s fees only
to prevailing applicants or employees is designed to avoid the chilling
effect from the possibility of paying the employer’s attorneys fees.
B. The Untangling Legal Effect of the Model Lifestyle Discrimination Statute
The proposed model lifestyle discrimination statute adopts statutory
language that is typical of many of the state statutes that protect lawful
off-duty activities of employees.227
Like many of the existing
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes, the proposal provides
associated with lawful off-duty activities. See also supra Part III.C (discussing lifestyles
discrimination statutory loopholes as applied to bloggers).
223
The non-italicized statutory wording in this section is based on COLO. REV. STAT. § 2434-402.5(2)(a) (2001). The masculine is used here as it is in the Colorado statute; however, it
applies equally to female and male applicants or employees.
224
The non-italicized statutory wording in this section is based on COLO. REV. STAT. § 2434-402.5(2)(b) (2001).
225
See supra text accompanying § 3.
226
See supra text accompanying § 4. The provision only providing for the possibility of
awarding attorney fees and court costs to aggrieved parties is to eliminate the possible
chilling effect that allowing the “prevailing party” to collect may have on potential
claimants.
227
See supra Part II.C (discussing the statutory text of the currently existing
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statutes).
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protection for lawful off-duty activities and conduct, but goes further to
provide protection for the speech that is associated with those activities
or conduct.228 The loopholes found in many of the existing lifestyle
discrimination statutes that could be used to prevent statutory protection
for bloggers are closed by protecting the speech that is associated with
the lawful off-duty activity or conduct.229
The proposed model
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute not only proposes the
additional protection for speech associated with the lawful off-duty
activities or conduct, but also seeks to overcome other statutory
weaknesses found in many of the existing state statutes.230
The proposed model lifestyle discrimination statute serves to create
rights for all applicants and employees engaging in lawful off-duty
activities or conduct and provides protection for the speech associated
with the protected activities or conduct. The particular additional speech
protection is important for all employees, but particularly at-will
employee bloggers. Taken together, the provisions in the model statute
serve to give at-will employee bloggers protection for having and
maintaining a blog and the speech associated with their blog when it is
done lawfully, on their own time, and away from the employer’s
premises. The off-duty and off-premises mandates allow employers to
have the necessary, requisite control in the employment relationship
during working hours, while giving employees the freedom to have a
life away from work and the ability to participate in activities like
blogging.
Protecting employee bloggers’ speech associated with blogging is
meant to remedy the loophole created in some state lifestyle
discrimination statutes that already protect employees’ lawful off-duty
activities or conduct. It also serves to give clear guidance in this area of
employment law jurisprudence. This proactive measure seeks to
advance the policies behind lifestyle discrimination statutes, which
recognize that the employment-at-will doctrine does not always
adequately protect an employee’s right to a life away from work. This
model comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute attempts to do
away with the injustice created with the possibility that the dichotomy of

See supra § 1 and accompanying text (adding the additional protection for speech
associated with lawful off-duty activities or conduct).
229
See supra Part III.C (discussing the loopholes in existing lifestyle discrimination
statutes that leave at-will employee bloggers without protection).
230
See supra Parts III.C.1-5 (discussing the current lifestyle discrimination statutes’
weaknesses and loopholes).
228
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a blogger’s activity of having and maintaining a blog being treated
differently than the blogger’s speech within the blog.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislation that protects an employee’s lawful off-duty activities and
the speech that is associated with those activities bridges the gap in atwill employee protection where the judicial decisions of the
employment-at-will doctrine and current lifestyle discrimination statutes
fall short. Protecting employee’s rights serves to counterbalance the
employment-at-will doctrine’s harsh effects.
Currently, lifestyle
discrimination statutes seek to provide protection for lawful off-duty
conduct, activities or speech; however, no statutes adequately combine
the protection in such a way as to bring at-will employee bloggers under
the statutory protection. At-will employee bloggers escape protection
under the current lifestyle discrimination statutes because either a statute
only protects activity or conduct, but does not adequately protect the
employee blogger’s speech, or the statute only protects speech, but
leaves the activity or conduct of blogging unprotected. This is not the
correct outcome for legislation intended to further employee rights by
creating a wall against which an employer’s pervasive hand cannot
reach. A comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute protecting
lawful off-duty conduct or activities and the speech associated with it
provides clear guidance to the courts, employers, and employees as to
employees’ rights away from work, particularly while blogging. A
comprehensive lifestyle discrimination statute that adequately protects
bloggers will help reduce the number of unsuspecting dooced
employees, because it gives certainty to at-will employee bloggers who
are currently trapped in a world wide web of unresolved employment
law legal issues.
Shelbie J. Byers231
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